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AJ3STRACT 
This paper follows Noguera 's (2012) sti.dy on factors that mzght influence the return on asset 
: (ROA) pe1formance of RE/Ts, including the engagement of more non-executive dzrectors and 1110re 
female directors. Usmg Australian data, the ROA performance of 37 Austrahan Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (A-RE/Ts) from 2008 to 2011 zs examined As wzth Noguera (2012), larger A-
KEJTs are found to tend to have higher ROA pe1formance and A-RE/Ts that employ more debt fare 
'more poor'/y. 
'~oWev&r, the findings show that the proportwn of non-e1:ecut1ve directors and female dz rectors are 
ltbt statistically related to such performance A Tobzn 's Q measure zs also used to provzde a more 
~"market-based metric of A-REIT performance The Tobin Q measure shows tmproved market values 
':;foxrA-1>.EITs over 2010 and 201 I whzle those wzth an "office" focus tend to have performed more 
" Hy 'using this measure. A pooled regression ts utzl1sed as well as fixed and random effects 
~ enes to investigate factors influencing REIT performance The findmgs suggest usefitl 
" ~for :hREIT investors and boards 
, offis:: A~REITs, performance 
"<.<.....,t.0~"-........ ~ 
1)~~" 
UDlJCTION 
''-
:a (2012) investigated whether the composition of US REIT boards impact on REIT 
bilify{as measured by return on assets (ROA)), particularly from the viewpoint of the impact 
'Cutive (inside) and non-executive (outside and independent) directors Noguera's (2012) 
owed earlier work by Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) with US REITs, who found that there 
JSitiv~ relationship between the number of outside directors and REIT performance as 
~1ey return on equity (ROE). Contrary to Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), Noguera (2012) did 
O'Portion of outside directors had a positive relationship with ROA 
);;,(,_~ '..,~ ~ 
)s' paper is to examine whether outside directorships are related to ROA 
d lmgest REIT market in the world, the Australian REIT (A-REIT) 
~parti&ula:rly if more gender-diverse boards are positively related to A-
lmpexitnas not yet been reported on in the literature. 
' 
"" av global real estate investment trust (REIT) market is over US$1 
the US RElT market is the oldest and largest, the A-REIT market 1s 
.., ~htrgest RElT market in the world with a market capitalization of around 
~M QfJ:l2}. The largest A-REITs include Westfield Group, Stockland and GPT 
~ m"a:rket trapitalizations of around A$25 billion, A$8 billion and A$6 billion 
" ~OJ2). The A-REIT market is larger than the French, German, British, Japanese 
:R'ElT markets and so worthy of attention. 
c..REITs are an important sector in Australian financial markets. They manage 
:Glt ofmstltutional grade property assets (PIR 2011) and constitute around 6% of 
ation of the Australian Stock Exchange at August 2013 Major superannuation 
onal inves1ors such as lNG, Vanguard and Colonial First State have substantial 
y,nA-REITs. Newell (2007) also identifies the importance of A-REITs to industry-
based super funds. 
Regarding gender-diverse boards and A-REIT performance, since women constitute a substantially 
greater proportion of the workforce when compared to directorship pos1t10ns, it is possible that their 
employment as directors might bnng a presently underutilized skill set to the table that may 
improve A-REIT performance. This 1s the pnmary hypothesis exammed m this paper It appears 
that there has been an increase m the proportion of women directors m A-REITs over the last few 
years and an increase m A-REIT pe1 formance - this paper attempts to examine a possible 
relationship It 1s not suggested that intellectual differences may be identified between men and 
women directors, instead it is proposed that it 1s possible that A-REIT boards may benefit from 
utilizing an mtellectual capacity that they have not engaged before Additionally smce there are 
fewer women directo1s m A-REITs compaied to the average of the companies that constitute the 
S&P/ASX 200 (Australian Census of Women in Leadership 2012) it is possible that A-REITs may 
benefit more 
The structure of this paper is as follows The next sect10n briefly summarizes the related literature 
The followmg section presents the model and reports the findings The last section reports the 
conclusions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section examines two broad strands of literature. The first strand relates to board structure and 
firm performance, particularly the use of outside or non-executive directors. The second strand 
ielates to women d11ecto1s and firm perfonnance 
In investigating board structure and performance, much of the literature finds the idea that non-
execut1ve directors may offer useful eA.pe1i advice as well as providing an effective monitoring role 
to be quite appealmg and hence likely to have a positive impact on performance. Mehran (1995), 
Klem (1998), Hennalm and We1sbach (2003) and Adams, Hermalm and We1sbach (2010) all 
provide useful summaries of the hterature in this atea and conclude there is no clear empirical 
outcome as to whether the p1 oport1on of outside, non-executive directors is positively related to 
board performance. Recent work by Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) also does not find statistically 
s1gmficant relat10nsh1ps between accounting measures of performance and the proportion of non-
executrve d1rectors. Adams, Hermalm and We1sbach (2010) suggest board composition and board 
perfo1mance may be jointly endogenous and this could be the reason why no clear empirical 
relat10nship has yet been found. 
Amongst the REIT literature, the relationship 1s also not clear. While Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) 
find a positive link between ROE performance and the number of outside directors, Noguera (2012) 
does not find a link between ROA performance and the number of outside directors Parker (2009) 
broadly mvest1gated the relationship between A-REIT board composition (board size, proportion of 
female directors, proportion of directors with property experience, proportion of directors with 
directorships in other listed entities including other A-REITs) and price performance to conclude 
that there didn't appear to be strong evidence linking such board composition measures and price 
increases and decreases. 
The engagement of women directors on public company boards has been discussed in the corporate 
governance and management literature for nearly twenty years (see for example Burke 1994; Burke 
1997; Terjesen, Sealy and Singh 2009) The earlier work was qmte normative m nature and 
generally argued that women directors should be employed for the different insight on consumers 
and consumer markets that they might bnng. More recently, the finance literature has taken an 
empirical interest. Farrell and Hersch (2005) report that women directors tend to serve on better 
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financially-performing boards, while Gul, Srmidh1 and Ng (2011) suggest that more firm-specific 
information 1s reflected m the stock prices of firms that employ gender-diverse boards. Recently, 
Adams and FeITeira (2009) also found that gender diversity is positively linked to board 
effectiveness. These empmcal mvestigat1ons have added a "business case" argument to the 
engagement of women directo1s on boards. These studies and others by B1hmoria (2000), Smgh, 
Vinnicombe and Johnson (2001), Burke (2003), Shergill and Townsend (2006) and Mateos de 
Cabo, Gimeno and Nieto (2012) have generally been interested m women directors on US and UK 
industrial public company boards, often emphas1zmg sectors such as retail, bankmg, health and 
media that employ a substantial number of women 
Much of the discussion 1egarding women d1rectors on boards actually relates to the paucity of 
women directors, as m Hyland and Marcellino (2002), Sheridan (2002), Singh and V mrncombe 
(2003, 2004) and Catalyst (2012), together with the possible reasons as to why there might be such 
a low proportional representat10n of women drrecto1 s on boards An extension to this discuss10n 1s 
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) who e'<amme the relat1onsh1p between board size and women 
directors to find that larger boards tend to have mo1 e women. More recently, D1movski, Lombardi 
and Cooper (2013) exammed women directo1s on tbe boards of A-REITs, findmg that only arou11d 
one in every two A-REITs engaged a female d1recto1 on their board. The paper concluded that 
larger A-REITs and A-REITs that had Iaiger boards generally engaged more women directors. 
The literature regarding firm performance and women directors on boards is also not entirely clear 
Only more recently in Farrell and Hersch (2005) is one of the first empmcal mvest1gat10ns argumg 
a positive relationship between firm perfo1r.rnnce and the prop01i1on of women directors 
Interestingly Adams and FerreJra (2009) found that there 1s greater gender diversity in firms that 
perform worse. They find women directors attend more board meetings and impose a greater 
monitoring role than their male counterparts This, bowever, is m line with the argument that too 
much monitoring may decrease shareholder value (Adams and Ferreira 2009). 
DATA, METHOD AND FINDINGS 
The sample for this study comprises an unbalanced panel of company and gender data (with two or 
more years of data) from 3 7 A-REITs hsted on the Australian Stock Exchange durmg 2008 to 2011 
The data for this study was primarily derived fi om the Connect 4 Boardroom and DatAnalys1s 
databases. This study uses variables from previous boatd structure studies that have been found to 
have a relationship with current year ROA and Tobm's Q. ROA data 1s derived directly from 
" DatAnalysis while Tobin's Q (TOBINSQ) 1s calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity 
j)lus the book value of the liabilities d1v1ded by the book value of the total assets us mg the data from 
JJptA:nalysis and following the method in Kohl and Schaefers (2012) The explanatory varrables are 
'"" 
"" 
• the lagged proportion of women (LPROPWOMEN). The lagged van able is used 
to better examine causality, adapted from Farrell and Hersch (2005), Adams and 
Ferre1ra (2009); 
the lagged proportion of non-executive directors (LPROPNONEXEC). The lagged 
variable is used to better examine causality, adapted from Noguera (2012), Ghosh 
and Sinnans (2003); 
""-Jhe-debt to equity ratio (DEBTTOEQ), adapted from Noguera (2012) who used 
~l:lt to assets; and 
natural logarithm of the market capitalization in millions of dollars 
CAPMIL) (Noguera (2012); Ghosh and Sirmans (2003)). 
~&:iable relating to A-REITs that have stapled securities (STAPLED) is also tested. 
Urity entities (where units in a trust and shares m a company are linked and must be 
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traded (bought or sold) together on the stock market) are common amongst A-REITs. The trust 
generally owns the rental income-earning property assets and the company 1s often a management 
company and/or one that is involved in property development activities. A-REITs often focus their 
act1vit1es into office, retail, industrial or diversified sectors. Two additional dummy variables are 
mcluded in the modellmg in this study for retail and office type A-REITs (RETAIL and OFFICE) to 
control for such property types. Year dummies for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are also included. 
Three different panel models are used on the data. Firstly, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with cluster robust standard erro1s; secondly a fixed-effects model; and thirdly a random-
effects model The pooled regression assumes no unique attributes or characteristics amongst each 
of the A-REITs. The fixed-effects model assumes there are unique charactenstics amongst the A-
REITs that are not the result of random variation. The random-effects model assumes there are 
urnque characteristics that do not correlate with the regressor vanables. This model is particularly 
useful in drawing inferences about populat10ns, not only the examined sample. 
It is the PROPNONEXEC and PROPWOMEN variables that are the p1imary focus of this study. 
These variables test the hypotheses that the more outside expe1i mvolvement, the greater the 
monitoring to the firm and the more likely a positive impact on performance. Multicollmearity has 
been tested for and it is not a problem using both these variables in the model. Heteroskedasticity 1s 
dealt with using the robust standard error command in STA TA. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics Panel A reports the statistics for all 134 observations from 
2008 to 2011. The study staits at 2008 because of the significant negative structural impact of the 
Centro Properties announcements in December 2007 and the global financial crisis (GFC), as 
1dentrfied in Dimovski (2009) The Aurora Buy Write Income trust is excluded from the data since 
its mcome is more as an mvestor m prope1iy securities and it is an active call and put writer being 
quite different to the other A-REITs. Some extreme outlier observations over 3.5 standard 
deviations from the mean durmg the global financial crisis were also excluded for Centro and 
Trmity 
P.mel A 
2008 to 2011 
Mean 
Prop Women 0 076 
Retail 0 218 
Marl.et Cap (mill) 1620 156 
Prop Non-e'\.ec dir 0 770 
Office 0156 
Debt to eqmty 1 001 
Stapled 0 626 
ROA 0 042 
Tobm's Q 0 860 
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Standard 
Deviation 
0 098 
0414 
3948 335 
0 176 
364 
3 227 
0486 
0 051 
0 118 
Mm 
0 000 
0 
0 28 
0 
0 
-28 237 
0 
-0 191 
0 556 
Ma" 
0 500 
28865 88 
8 043 
0200 
l 269 
Panel B 
2008 to 2011 
Mean 2008 Mean 200Q Me.m 2010 Mean 2011 
Prop Women 0 059 0 075 0 084 0 107 
Retail 0 235 0 226 0 222 0 229 
Market Cap (mill) 1928 02 1992 92 1797 27 1301 80 
Prop Non-e\.cc clir 0 767 0 775 0 815 0 777 
Office 0 118 0 129 0 167 0 143 
Debt to equity I 019 0 420 1 005 I 296 
Stapled 0 676 0 677 0 639 0 657 
ROA 0 037 0 037 0 039 0 0;,3 
Tobin's Q 0 820 a 813 0 875 0 879 
A-REIT Summary Characteristics for 2008 - 2011 
Source: Authors 
Table I 
"''' ~"'B reports the means by year. A steady increase in the proportion of women directors and 
'Ik~v~detrt over the years 2008 to 2011. Tobin's Q pe1formance appears to improve in 2010 
(JU. While not specifically in the tables, 1t is worth notmg that the largest A-REITs also 
i:n -employ the most women directors, with Westfield Group, Stockland, GPT and Goodman 
1t'alJ employing two female directors m 2011 (and all havmg at least one female director 
'the fbur year period of the study). Many smaller A-REITs and even some larger ones, such 
~and Centro Retail, did not engage any women directors at all during the four years. Table 2 
"correlation matrix for the explanatory variables used m the model, observing that stapled 
, to be larger. 
Lprop Lprop Debttoeq Stapled LnCapmil 
Women nonexec 
-0.045 
-0.208 
0.231 -0.227 
0.064 -0.028 0.482 
-°b.126 0.039 -0.150 0.196 
-0.001 -0.237 -0.129 
~ 
ill 'Matrix for Explanatory Variables 
Sotu:ce: Authors 
'-" Table2 
Retail 
-0.224 
Table 2 reports the results for the variables discussed and their relationship to A-REIT ROA 
performance dunng the four year pe1 iod 2008 to 2011 The signs of the coefficients on the lagged 
propo1tions of women directors and non-eA.ecut1ve directors are not quite as expected although the 
p-values are not significant The signs on the other coefficients are generally as might be expected. 
(While the time dummies are not formally reported, they are not significant either) The p-values on 
the F tests fo1 the fixed events model and the chi squared for the random events model suggest the 
models are not ideal There does not appear to be evidence of significant enough differences across 
A-REITs for these panel models to be utilized, therefore a pooled panel remams to explain the 
factors that influence ROA for A-REITs In bnef, it appears that those firms that employed a higher 
debt to equity ratio (holding other factors constant) performed more poorly on the ROA measure 
whLle larger firms (holding other factors constant) performed better during this 2008 to 2011 period 
Pooled Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
Panel Panel 
Obsen ations 134 Coet # Pr# Coef Pr 
c 0 018 0 503 -0 017 0 749 
LPROPWOMEN -0 007 0 900 0 024 0 766 
LPROPNONEXEC -0 031 0 305 -0 32 0 441 
DEBTTOEQ -0 002 0 032** 0 001 0 783 
STAPLED -0 009 0 551 omitted 
LNCAPMIL 0 008 0 042** 0 126 0 063* 
RETAIL 0 001 0 981 omitted 
OFFICE -0 005 0 726 omitted 
0 135 0 067 R Squared 
F 0 93 0491 
Wald ch12 
* t *. "* and t md 1cate the level of s1gmficance at l % 5% and 10% n:spectively 
# cluster robust coefficients and p-values are reported 
Year dummies of2009 2010, 2011 are included m the models but not formally reported 
Panel 
Coef 
0 015 
-0 005 
-0 030 
-0 OD! 
-0 008 
0 008 
0 001 
-0 004 
0 134 
16 86 
Regression Results for ROA Performance of A-REITs, 2008 to 2011 
Source: Authors 
Table 3 
Pr 
0 599 
0 927 
0 276 
0425 
0 520 
0 004*** 
0 931 
0 761 
0 077 
Tobin's Q is sometimes used as a market based performance measure, so a similar modeling 
approach 1s attempted using Tobin's Q as the dependent variable rather than the accountmg based 
ROA measure in Table 3 This, however, presents an endogene1ty problem with LNCAPMIL. ROA 
rs selected as the instrumental vanable for LNCAPMIL and the models rerun. The Hausman test 
suggests the random-effects approach is preferable to the fixed-effects approach (with a chi squared 
of 3.23 and p-value of 0.863). In considering the pooled regression, 1t appears that A-REITs whicR 
had a better ROA performance performed better on this market based metric while office A-REITs ~ 
appear to have performed more poorly than other sector types. There rs also some evidence to: 
suggest that those A-REITs that employed a higher debt to eqmty ratio performed more poorly on' 
this metric. 
When the individual attributes of each of the A-REITs are controlled using the fixed and random 
effects models, 1t appears that the A-REITs themselves that employed more debt performed mor 
poorly while A-REITs that had higher ROA performance also rated higher on this market base 
metric It is worth noting also that year dummies for 2010 and 2011 were statistically significan 
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positive, at the 1 % level, in all models, suggesting that A-REIT values improved sigmficantly 
during these two years 
Pooled Fn.ecl-Etfocts R,mclom-Effects 
Panel Panel Panel 
Observations 134 Coef# Pr# Coef Pr Coef Pr 
c 0 831 0 000**" 0 863 0 000 ~** 0 861 0 ODO*"'* 
LPROPWOMEN 0 103 0 326 -0 186 0 085~ -0 081 0 381 
LPROPNONEXEC -0 023 0 611 -0 036 0 522 -0 044 0 363 
DEBTTOEQ -0 006 0 069* -0 007 0 004"** -0 006 0 002>1<** 
STAPLED -0 010 0 744 om1tted -0 001 0 995 
ROA 0 446 0 008**' 0 223 0 111 0 299 0 024"* 
RETAIL 0 018 0 697 omitted 0 019 0 556 
OFFICE -0 056 0 013** omltted -0 061 0 111 
R Squared 0 249 0 115 0 216 
F 6 69 0 000 
Wald ch12 51 30 0 000 
**"'·**,and * md1cate the level ol s1gmftcance at I% 5% and 10% respectively 
"~" "'" 11 cluster robust coefficients and p-values are reported 
~ Ye11t dumm1es of2009. 2010. 2011 are included m the models but not lonnally reported 
~ 
Regression Results for Tobin's Q Performance of A-REITs, 2008 to 2011 
Source: Authors 
Table 4 
~ndings are consistent with Noguera's (2012) study of US REITs, suggestmg that the 
·;on of non-executive directors is not related to the return on asset performance of REI Ts 
Yz also does not find that the proportion of women directors 1s statistically significantly 
le ROA performance of these firms either It appears the skill set that 1s brought to the 
ch directors per se doesn't appear to impact the performance of A-REIT firms. 
'Ca'usal relationship is identified using a Tobin's Q metnc as the dependent variable 
more accounting based ROA measure. It is likely that havmg such directors may 
-monitoring role often sought as part of the useful governance of firms but, as 
in: (2009) conclude, greater external morntormg and female representation 
Uy permit better performance. 
er,, by market capitalization, A-REITs have performed better, on a ROA 
an smaller firms during the period of 2008 to 2011. Add1t1onally, A-REITs 
"'OD asset performance had better Tobin's Q performance while A-REITs 
e tended to perform more poorly on a Tobm's Q basis It is also worth 
iie b:roadly have had their Tobin's Q values significantly and positively 
d 2:011. When the individual attributes of A-REITs are considered and 
'"' Gidels employed, it may be observed that those which employed more 
obin's Q measure while those that performed better on a ROA basis 
Qmetric. 
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